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REGULATORY TAKINGS, HISTORIC
PRESERVATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
SINCE PENN CENTRAL:




S eventeen years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.' Since then,
the Supreme Court, as well as state and lower federal courts, have
struggled to develop a suitable test to apply when required to deter-
mine whether a regulation that restricts or deprives a property owner
of a right to develop, improve, or alter property constitutes a compen-
sable taking under the Fifth Amendment. Although the Supreme
Court has revisited this perplexing issue several times since Penn Cen-
tral, no case has adopted a clear, unambiguous, bright-line test. How-
ever, a number of state, federal, and Supreme Court decisions have
distinguished Penn Central and created tests providing greater protec-
tion of private property rights by requiring the payment of compensa-
tion for regulatory restriction.
This recent trend of increasing protection of private property rights
may be due in part to the change in the makeup of the Supreme Court
itself; Chief Justice Rehnquist is one of two remaining members of the
Court that decided Penn Central, and his contribution was the now-
famous dissent.
As regulatory takings jurisprudence has evolved, a disquieting prob-
lem has emerged with regard to environmental regulations and his-
toric landmarking. There is a growing sense that it is proper to utilize
environmental and historic preservation laws to control development
and other change even in the absence of environmental protection,
wildlife conservation, architectural, or historic preservation issues.
Such private, hidden agendas threaten to undermine the legitimate
goals of those who would protect the best in our man-made and natu-
ral environments through legitimate research and study.
This Article will first discuss the holding in Penn Central, with em-
phasis on Justice Rehnquist's forceful and prophetic dissent. Thereaf-
ter, it will examine Supreme Court, state, and federal takings cases
since Penn Central and analyze their potential effect on historic pres-
ervation jurisprudence.
* Chauncey L. Walker is a partner and Scott D. Avitabile is an associate at
Cuddy & Feder & Worby, a law firm in White Plains, New York.
1. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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I. PENN CENTRAL AND ITS PROGENY
A. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
1. Majority Opinion
No case has had a greater impact on landmarking jurisprudence
than Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.2 In 1965,
New York City ("City") had adopted a Landmarks Preservation Law,3
under which a Landmarks Preservation Commission ("Commission")
created by the law was authorized to designate a building a
"landmark" if certain statutory criteria were met.4 Once designated a
landmark, a property owner's options concerning the use of the
landmark site became heavily restricted. The ordinance imposed an
affirmative obligation on the owner to keep the exterior features of
the building in "good repair."' Any proposal to alter the exterior ar-
chitectural features of the landmark had to be approved in advance by
the issuance of a certificate of appropriateness from the Commission.6
In 1967, the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal in
New York City a landmark. Penn Central Transportation Company
("Penn Central"), which owns the station, sought approval to erect an
office building addition above the terminal. Two plans were presented
to the Commission in an attempt to secure the requisite certificate of
appropriateness. Both were rejected.' Consequently, Penn Central
filed suit in New York Supreme Court, alleging a taking of its property
without just compensation and without due process of law, in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.8
The trial court granted injunctive and declaratory relief, barring the
City from using the Landmarks Law to impede the construction of any
lawful structure on the terminal site.' The City appealed and the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, holding that the
restrictions on development above the terminal "were necessary to
promote the legitimate public purpose of protecting landmarks."'10
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there could be
2. Id.
3. Preservation of Landmarks and Historical Districts, 2 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE
ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 et seq. (1976).
4. The ordinance defines a "landmark" as:
Any improvement, any part of which is thirty years old or older, which has a
special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of
the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or na-
tion and which has been designated as a landmark pursuant to the provisions
of this chapter.
2 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A § 207-1.0(n) (1976).
5. Id. § 207-10.0(a).
6. Id. §§ 207-4.0 to 207-9.0.
7. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116-18.
8. Id. at 119.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 119-20.
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no "taking" since the Landmarks Law had not transferred control of
the terminal to the City, but had only restricted Penn Central's use of
the property.1
The U.S. Supreme Court framed the main issue to be reviewed as
"whether the restrictions imposed by New York City's law upon [Penn
Central's] exploitation of the Terminal site effect a 'taking' of [Penn
Central's] property for a public use .... ", To make this determina-
tion, the Court reviewed several earlier "takings" cases and the factors
that had shaped the decisions in those cases. The Court determined
these factors to include the "economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has in-
terfered with distinct investment-backed expectations."'" The Court
noted that it had dismissed "takings" cases in the past when the chal-
lenged regulation did not interfere "with the reasonable expectations"
of the claimant, "even when such action caused economic harm."' 4
The Court held that since Penn Central could (1) continue to use
the terminal as it had used it prior to the designation, the law did not
interfere with Penn Central's "primary expectation" concerning the
use of the property and thus Penn Central would continue to obtain
a "reasonable return" from the property;' 5 and (2) had unused devel-
opment rights "suitable for the construction of new office buildings"
at another location, there was not a significant interference with Penn
Central's investment-backed expectations.' 6 Therefore, the law was
held not to interfere with property rights to the point of
unconstitutionality.' 7
2. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, conceeded that the Court
has had difficulty structuring a "set formula" for determining when a
compensable taking has occurred.' 8 Justice Brennan recognized that
11. Id. at 121.
12. Id at 122.
13. Id. at 124.
14. Id. at 124-25.
15. Id. at 136. The Landmarks Law defines "reasonable return" as an annual re-
turn of six percent of the value of the improved land. 2 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A
§ 207-1.0(v)(1) (1976).
16. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137. The Court noted that under the Landmarks
Law, Penn Central was not prohibited from occupying all space above the terminal.
Id. at 136. Rather, the Court stressed that Penn Central had not sought approval for a
smaller building, which may have been granted. Id. at 137. The Court further noted
that the unused development rights were "transferable to at least eight parcels in the
vicinity of the Terminal." Id. The Court noted that, although the transfer of rights in
this manner may not have constituted "just compensation" if a "taking" occurred, this
transfer served to mitigate any financial burdens. Id.
17. Id. at 138.
18. Justice Brennan stated, "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop
any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than re-
19951
822 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
each case had required an ad hoc, factual inquiry, although several
factors, used inconsistently, have emerged from these cases.'9 In dis-
sent, Justice Rehnquist criticized both the majority's test to determine
if a taking had occurred and the rationale for the conclusion that no
compensable taking had occurred under the facts as presented.
In three sentences, Justice Rehnquist set the tone for the dissent:
The owner of a building might initially be pleased that his property
has been chosen by a distinguished committee of architects, histori-
ans, and city planners for such a singular distinction. But he may
well discover, as appellant Penn Central Transportation Co. did
here, that the landmark designation imposes upon him a substantial
cost, with little or no offsetting benefit except for the honor of the
designation. The question in this case is whether the cost associated
with the city of New York's desire to preserve a limited number of
"landmarks" within its borders must be borne by all of its tax payers
or whether it can instead be imposed entirely on the owners of the
20individual properties.
The theme presented by the above quote expresses Justice Rehn-
quist's concern that society as a whole through the government, rather
than an individual, should bear the burden of a high cost with low
reciprocal benefits.
The dissent addressed the analogy between landmark preservation
and zoning restrictions cited by the majority as a justification for its
holding.21 Justice Rehnquist distinguished between a zoning restric-
tion, likely to be offset by an increase in property value that flows
from restrictions similarly imposed on all landowners in a community,
and landmark designation, affecting relatively few, separated build-
ings.22 This tradeoff, in which all property owners in an area are
under similar land-use restrictions, is a benefit to both the municipal-
ity and to all the owners. Quoting Justice Holmes, Justice Renquist
found that there is "an average reciprocity of advantage. '2 3 However,
when the cost associated with the promulgation of a restrictive
landuse regulation is imposed solely upon an individual property
owner and not uniformly upon all of his or her neighbors, "no such
reciprocity exists."' 4
main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id at 124 (citing Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
19. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
20. Id at 138-39.
21. The majority compares the restriction against building above the Terminal to a
zoning ordinance that prohibits, for aesthetic reasons, two or more adult theaters
within a specified area. Id. at 135. The majority fails, however, to make the distinc-
tion between all property owners sharing the benefit, as well as the burden, in that
situation, as opposed to the owner of a landmark, who bears the burden alone.
22. Id at 139-40.
23. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
24. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 140.
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Under the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, an owner
of a designated property is under an affirmative duty to preserve the
property as a landmark at his or her own expense.25 Justice Rehnquist
concluded that this type of affirmative obligation, which may cost the
landowner (as in this case) millions of dollars, with no reciprocal ben-
efit, and with no similar duty or restriction on neighboring landown-
ers, was beyond the magnitude of the restrictions imposed by normal
zoning regulations: "The rubric of 'zoning' has not yet sufficed to
avoid the well-established proposition that the Fifth Amendment bars
the 'Government from forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole.' "26
Since the neighboring landowners are free to develop their proper-
ties under the broad New York City zoning laws, and Penn Central
must forever maintain its property in its present state, the "property
has been thus subjected to a nonconsensual servitude not borne by
any neighboring or similar properties. 27
Justice Rehnquist next addressed the majority's analysis of the nui-
sance exception to the guarantee of just compensation. The majority,
in its analysis of cases upholding landuse regulations and restrictions,
including zoning laws that destroyed or adversely affected property
rights, discussed several cases in which the Court based its holding on
the promotion of the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the
public. 28 The dissent rebutted any implied connection between a zon-
ing law promulgated to prevent a harmful public nuisance and the re-
strictions imposed by the Landmarks Law. The dissent asserted that
the nuisance exception is not "coterminous with the police power it-
25. Id The relevant section of the ordinance mandates that:
Every person in charge of an improvement on a landmark site or in an his-
toric district... [must] keep in good repair (1) all of the exterior portions of
such improvement and (2) all interior portions thereof which, if not so main-
tained, may cause or tend to cause the exterior portions of such improve-
ment to deteriorate, decay or become damaged or otherwise to fall into a
state of disrepair.
2 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-10.0(a).
26. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 140 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49 (1960)).
27. Id. at 143. In a footnote to the quote, Justice Rehnquist noted that the fact
that Penn Central had not made use of its development rights prior to the imposition
of the restriction is irrelevant, as the Fifth Amendment must be applied with refer-
ence to all suitable uses. Id. at 143 n.6.
28. Id. at 125-28 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)
(landowner prohibited from mining sand and gravel below the water line); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (landowner forced to cut down infested trees); Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (landowner prohibited from mining
coal within 150 feet of a residential property foundation); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (landowner prohibited from operating an existing brickyard
within a residential area)). Each of these cases presented clear issues of public health,
safety, and welfare.
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self. The question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the
safety, health, or welfare of others."29
New York City was not preventing a nuisance, nor was there any
danger to the community posed by the proposed development. The
proposed building met all requisite zoning, safety, and health require-
ments. Penn Central was forbidden to build simply because the
Landmark Preservation Commission wished to forever preserve, in its
present state, what it believed to be an outstanding example of beaux
arts architecture.3 °
The City acquired a servitude that required compensation because
Penn Central was not free to use its property as would otherwise have
been permitted under applicable zoning regulations, but must forever
strictly adhere to past use and maintain the terminal in its present
state and in good repair.31
The dissent concluded this issue by noting that a multimillion-dollar
loss was imposed on Penn Central without the offset of benefits gener-
ally associated with a zoning restriction. Moreover, this restriction, as
the City conceded, benefited all the citizens of New York. The dissent
asserted that "[i]t is exactly this imposition of general costs on a few
individuals at which the 'taking' protection is directed.
32
The final issue addressed by the dissent was whether the ability to
make a reasonable return on a property investment should affect a
takings analysis. It pointed out that the Supreme Court has held that,
even if the destruction of property rights would not otherwise consti-
tute a taking, the inability of the owner to make a reasonable return
on his or her property will trigger a compensable taking under the
Fifth Amendment.33 The dissent stressed that the converse was not
the case; a taking does not become noncompensable simply because
29. Id. at 145.
30. Id at 146. The dissent explained:
Penn Central is prevented from further developing its property basically be-
cause too good a job was done in designing and building it. The City of New
York, because of its unadorned admiration for the design, has decided that
the owners of the building must preserve it unchanged for the benefit of
sightseeing New Yorkers and tourists.
Id. (emphasis in original).
31. Id at 146. The dissent stated that even though Penn Central may continue to
use the terminal as it is presently used, the City otherwise "exercise[s] complete do-
minion and control over the surface of the land." Id. (quoting United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946)).
32. Id. at 147. In a footnote, the dissent noted that to require Penn Central main-
tain its property at its sole expense, for the benefit to the public at large, would be
analogous to a situation in which the government wished to preserve a pre-existing
canal system for public use, and rather than condemn it and compensate the owner,
simply order that the owner preserve it in its present state and keep it in "good re-
pair." Id. at 146 n.9 (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312 (1893)).
33. Id. at 149 (citing United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903)).
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government chooses to leave the landowner with some use of his or
her property.34
The New York City Zoning Resolution permitted the owner of a
designated landmark to "transfer" unused development rights from
the landmark site to adjacent properties. These rights are referred to
as "Transferrable Development Rights" or "TDRs. ' '35 In support of
their determination that a compensable taking had not occurred, the
majority noted that the property owner may therefore "transfer" de-
velopment rights from the landmark to adjoining property. The dis-
sent criticized the rationale on the ground that "just compensation"
does not mean approximate compensation, but rather "a full and per-
fect equivalent for the property taken. '36
The fact that the City believed TDRs to be "just compensation" was
irrelevant. As Justice Rehnquist explained, even the New York Court
of Appeals noted that TDRs have an uncertain and contingent market
value and do not "adequately preserve" the diminution in value asso-
ciated with a landmark designation.37 The dissent conceded that Penn
Central was offered a significant sum of money in return for the
TDRs, and since the record was not clear as to exactly how much,
considered that remand to the state court would be proper to deter-
mine if the value of the TDRs obviated the need for "just compensa-
tion" for the taking. 38
In conclusion, the dissent borrows a prophetic quote from Justice
Holmes, who in writing for the majority in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 9 warned that the courts were "in danger of forgetting that
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change. '
34. Id. at 149 (quoting United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917) ("it is the
character of the invasion, not the amount of damages resulting from it, so long as the
damage is substantial, that determines the question whether there is a taking.")).
35. See New York City Zoning Resolutions 74-79 to 74-793. The dissent specu-
lated that this law was promulgated specifically to ensure the constitutionality of the
Landmarks Law. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 150. The majority stated that this zoning
law was expanded in 1969, apparently for the specific purpose of permitting the own-
ers of the Grand Central Terminal to transfer their development rights "across a
street and opposite to another lot or lots which except for the intervention of streets
or street intersections [form] a series extending to the lot occupied by the
landmark.... ." Id. at 114.
36. Id at 150 (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312, 326 (1893)).
37. Id at 151 (quoting Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350
N.E.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. 1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976)).
38. Id at 152. The dissent made it clear that once a taking has occurred, the deter-
mination of what constitutes just compensation is a question for the courts alone to
decide. It is not to be left to the legislatures who are responsible for the very taking
being compensated. ld at 151.
39. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
40. Id at 152 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922)).
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B. Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After
Penn Central
1. Agins v. City of Tiburon
Two years after Penn Central, the Supreme Court decided Agins v.
City of Tiburon.4 Unlike Penn Central, Agins was a unanimous deci-
sion. The Court had undergone no personnel changes in those two
years.42 However, the same Court that struggled with Penn Central
had little difficulty holding that the Tiburon zoning ordinance did not
take Agins's property without just compensation.
The issue before the Court did not present the complex takings and
just compensation analysis of Penn Central. Agins purchased land for
development. Subsequent to the purchase, Tiburon enacted a zoning
ordinance 43 pursuant to a California state law that required the prepa-
ration of a plan for both land-use and development of open-space
lands.44 The zoning ordinance restricted the development of Agins's
property to single-family residences.
Because Agins had not submitted a site-plan proposal for develop-
ment under the challenged ordinance, the only question addressed by
the Court was whether the mere enactment of the ordinance consti-
tuted a taking.45 The Court applied a test not unlike that in Penn Cen-
tral, and held that a general zoning law may constitute a taking only
when "the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land."
46
The Court held that the ordinance substantially advanced legitimate
governmental goals.47 The Court stated that the zoning ordinance was
a legitimate exercise of the police power in that it would protect the
residents of Tiburon from the "ill effects of urbanization.
48
The issue of reciprocal benefits, a major concern in Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent in Penn Central,49 was addressed and found to exist in
this case. The public interest was served by the orderly and careful
development of residential property and open-air spaces."0 Moreover,
there was no indication that Agins would be burdened by the restric-
41. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
42. For the 1980 session, the Supreme Court was comprised of Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Stewart, and White, and Chief Justice
Burger. See BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1654 (6th ed. 1990).
43. Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance No. 124 N.S. §§ l(f) and (h).
44. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65561 (West Supp. 1979).
45. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
46. Id (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)).
47. Id. at 261.
48. Id.
49. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
50. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
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tion alone.5' Therefore, Agins would share both the benefits and the
burdens of the ordinance.
The final factor of the Penn Central analysis concerned whether the
ordinance prevented the best use of the land, or extinguished a funda-
mental attribute of ownership.52 The Court noted that the ordinance
permitted Agins to build as many as five single-family residences on
his five acres of property. Since Agins was free to pursue his "reason-
able investment expectations" by submitting a plan for development,
the ordinance did not deny Agins the "justice and fairness" guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment. 53
2. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis
The first Supreme Court case to address the issue of a regulatory
taking since Penn Central after a change in the makeup of the Court,54
was Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.55 In Keystone,
the Court reviewed a statute that limited coal mining so as to avoid
subsidence damage to surface buildings.56 The coal association chal-
lenged the statute as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 7 The
Court applied the Penn Central takings criteria to the facts, and con-
cluded there was no compensable taking.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens upheld the statute, con-
cluding that it abated a significant threat to the public welfare.58
Moreover, the petitioners failed to demonstrate a financial depriva-
tion significant enough to satisfy the "heavy burden placed upon one
alleging a regulatory taking."' 59 Since the statute prevented a threat to
the public and the owner's investment-backed expectations were not
unduly burdened, the statute survived a facial challenge.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Powell and newly
appointed Justices Scalia and O'Conner joined, again attacked the
Court's policy of applying the nuisance exception broadly. 6° The dis-
51. Id
52. Id (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946); Kaiser Action v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)).
53. Id. at 262-63 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978)).
54. Justice Burger and Justice Stewart retired and were replaced by Justices
O'Conner and Scalia. See BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 1654 (6th ed. 1990).
55. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
56. The challenged statute was PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.6 (1986).
57. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478-79.
58. Id at 485. The first part of the test is whether the regulation is abating a public
nuisance, so as to be consistent with the notion of a "reciprocity of advantage" that
Justice Holmes referred to in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Since all citizens benefit from governmental regulations that ensure the safety and
welfare of the community, this test was satisfied here. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-92.
59. Id at 493. Evidence that the Court was at least attempting to frame a concrete
test for a regulatory taking can be seen in the fact that the section addressing this
issue was titled "Diminution of Value and Investment-Backed Expectations." Id.
60. Id. at 511-13.
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sent pointed to the narrow exceptions under the nuisance doctrine:
first, that the regulation be based on health, safety, and welfare con-
cerns, and second, that the regulation not allow "complete extinction"
of the property's value.6'
The dissent based its criticism of the Court's conclusion on the na-
ture of the Subsidence Act, which was enacted primarily to preserve
buildings, economic development, and maintenance of property val-
ues to insure significant tax rolls.62 As to the economic development
element, the petitioner's interests in particular coal deposits were
completely destroyed. Therefore, the dissent argued, application of
the nuisance exception under these circumstances would permit a reg-
ulatory authority to extinguish all beneficial use of a citizen's property
with no compensation.63
3. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles County
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County,64 decided three months after Keystone, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist delivered the opinion of the Court. After a flood destroyed the
camp facilities on the twenty-one-acre parcel of land owned by the
church in Angeles National Forest, the church was forbidden from re-
building the camp on the site by an ordinance enacted in reaction to
the flooding.65 The ordinance stated that "[a] person shall not con-
struct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure, any por-
tion of which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of
the interim flood protection area .... ,66
This prohibition on rebuilding lasted for three years and the church
claimed this use restriction caused a compensable taking, despite the
fact that the prohibition was not permanent.67 The Court noted that
although the issue of whether a temporary taking through regulation
would require compensation had been presented before, the remedial
question was never reached. In each prior case, either the regulations
considered did not effect a taking, or the facts yet to be resolved might
still conclude that no taking occurred.6 Since the case before the
Court did not present these obstacles, the Supreme Court could finally
consider "whether the Just Compensation Clause requires the govern-
ment to pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings. 69
61. Id. at 513.
62. 1&
63. Id at 514.
64. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
65. See Los Angeles County Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 (Jan. 1979).
66. Id.
67. First English, 482 U.S. at 308.
68. Id. at 311.
69. Id at 313.
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The Court held that damages are recoverable for a temporary tak-
ing. The Court indicated that "where the government's activities have
already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action
by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation
for the period during which the taking was effective."7  Although the
factors enumerated in Penn Central and Keystone were not factors in
the decision, it bears noting that Justice Rehnquist, now writing for
the majority, addressed the concern first voiced by the Court in Penn-
sylvania Coal" and embraced by the majority in Penn Central that
"[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every change in
the general law."7
2
The Court stated that this holding may indeed lessen the flexibility
of legislators to enact land-use regulations. The justification is that
"such consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a
claim of constitutional right; many of the provisions of the Constitu-
tion are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of governmental
authorities, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is one of them. 73
4. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,74 the third regulatory
takings case to be decided by the Supreme Court in 1987, Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices Powell, O'Conner, White, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, wrote for the 5-4 majority. In Nollan, owners of beach-
front property applied to the California Coastal Commission for a
permit to build a residence on their property. The California Com-
mission required that the Nollans' grant a public easement across their
property as a condition to its granting the building permit.75
The Court held that the requirement of a public easement consti-
tuted a taking of the property. 6 The Court explained that it had re-
peatedly held that "the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
70. Id. at 321.
71. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
72. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The Court
in Penn Central also expressed concern that to embrace the argument that any restric-
tion imposed on individual landmarks constitutes a taking requiring payment would
invalidate not only the New York law, but all similar landmark legislation in the na-
tion. Id. at 131. This concern that such a ruling would stifle legislators in their efforts
to promulgate laws to protect the public welfare is refuted in Justice Rehnquist's dis-
sent in Penn Central, in which he states that many states and cities have chosen to
preserve landmarks by purchasing or condemning restrictive easements over the
facades of the landmarks, and are satisfied with the results. See id. at 152 n.14.
73. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
74. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
75. Id. at 828.
76. Id at 831.
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ized as property.'"" In reaching this conclusion, the Court again in-
dicated that the test for determining if a regulatory restriction
amounts to a compensable taking is (1) whether or not the regulation
substantially advances legitimate state interests or (2) denies an owner
the economically viable use of his or her land.78
The Court concluded that a valid nexus between the restrictive
condition and the justification for the prohibition did not exist. This
lack of nexus between the condition (granting an easement to the pub-
lic) and the purpose of the building restriction (protecting the public's
ability to see the beach) converted the original purpose of the building
restriction to something different from that which it had been. 79 The
purpose became the obtaining of an easement to serve a valid govern-
ment interest but without payment of compensation. The Court con-
cluded that "unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restric-
tion is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of
extortion.' "80
5. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,8 ' the shift toward
greater protection of property rights for regulatory takings became
more evident. Justice Powell and Justice Marshall, two more members
of the majority in Penn Central, retired and were replaced by Justices
Thomas and Souter prior to the Court's review of the claim in Lucas.
Although the holding was not ground-breaking in the analysis it ap-
plied, the opinion makes it clear that this.Court will not permit a com-
pensable taking for public purpose to be disguised as a regulation for
the "mitigation of serious public harm."82
Lucas purchased two beachfront residential lots on a barrier island
off the coast of South Carolina in 1986 with the intention of construct-
ing single-family homes.8 3 Two years later, South Carolina enacted
the Beachfront Management Act,84 which restricted the use of the
properties and prevented Lucas from erecting permanent habitable
structures on the properties. Relying on the Court's holding in Agins
77. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
433 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
78. Id. at 834.
79. Id. at 836-37. The Court further explained the "essential nexus" test by anal-
ogy. A law that protects the public welfare by forbidding the shouting of "fire" in
theaters, but allows those who pay the government $100.00 to do so, is not dissimilar
from demanding a public easement across private property in exchange for a waiver
of the law that prohibits building structures that block the view of the beach from the
public roadway. Id. at 837.
80. Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
81. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
82. Id. at 2895.
83. Id. at 2889.
84. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
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v. Tiburon,85 Lucas challenged the act, asserting that it caused a taking
because he had been deprived of all economically viable use of his
property.86
In Lucas, the Court acknowledged that in more than seventy years
of regulatory takings jurisprudence since Pennsylvania Coal, it had
never stated a "set formula" for determining when a regulation re-
stricting private property use goes "too far."87 The Court explained
that it had determined that a taking occurs when there is a physical
invasion of the property, or when the regulation at issue denies the
owner all economically beneficial or productive use of his or her
land.88 The Court further explained that the Fifth Amendment is also
violated when the land-use regulation "does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land.'"89 In a footnote to that quote, the Court conceeded that the
"deprivation of all economically feasible use" rule is not precise be-
cause it does not make clear which property interest the loss in value
is to be measured against.90
The Court warned of the danger presented whenever a regulation
leaves an owner of land without economically beneficial or productive
options for its use by requiring it to remain in its present or natural
state.91 As the Court noted, these regulations "carry with them a
heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form
of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."'92
In explaining how the transition from a focus on regulations that con-
trolled noxious uses to those that benefit the public was an easy one,
the Court stated that the distinction between "harm preventing" and
"benefit conferring" is "often in the eyes of the beholder."93
The Court concluded that when a statute deprives land of all eco-
nomically viable uses, governmental authority may resist compensa-
tion only when the proscribed use was not part of the owner's title to
begin with.94 This inquiry must be made based upon the state's com-
mon-law nuisance standards. Thus, if an owner is barred by regula-
tion from a use that is considered a common-law nuisance, the owner
is deemed to have constructive notice that the use was subject to pro-
85. See notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
86. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
87. Id. at 2893.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2894 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
90. Il at 2894 n.7. The Court criticized the calculation used by the New York
State Court of Appeals in determining that the diminution in a particular parcel's
value is to be based upon the total value of a claimant's other holdings in the vicinity.
The Court refers to this as "an extreme-and, we think, unsupportable-view of the
relevant calculus." Id
91. Id. at 2894-95.
92. Id at 2895.
93. Id. at 2897.
94. Id. at 2899.
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scription, and compensation is not required.95 However, if the regula-
tion proscribes a use that is not a common-law nuisance and all
economically viable use of the land is lost as a result, compensation is
required.96
Applied to the facts in Lucas, the Court held that it was unlikely
that the construction of residences on one's property in South Caro-
lina would be considered a common-law nuisance. 7 However, that
inquiry was left to the state court to determine on remand. The Court
offered guidance to the South Carolina court, stating that South Caro-
lina would be required to identify the background principles of nui-
sance and property law that prohibit those uses Lucas intended under
the present conditions of the property.98 Only then could this regula-
tion pass constitutional muster without compensating Lucas.
Justice Blackmun's dissent voiced concern that the majority had
"launched a missile to kill a mouse" and that the changes in takings
doctrine created by the Lucas decision may go beyond the narrow
confines of the facts presented, and may well affect the takings doc-
trine in the future.99
6. Dolan v. City of Tigard
The most recent Supreme Court case to address regulatory takings
is Dolan v. City of Tigard,10 in which Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
the opinion for the Court, after the retirement of Justice White and
the addition of Justice Ginsburg. The first issue before the Court was
whether an essential nexus existed between the condition imposed on
a landowner who sought a building permit and a legitimate state inter-
est.101 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the
Supreme Court of Oregon,0 2 which had held that the Tigard City
Planning Commission did not unconstitutionally "take" Dolan's
property. 10 3
When Dolan applied for a permit to expand her store and pave her
parking lot, the Tigard City Planing Commission granted approval
upon the condition that she dedicate a portion of her land for a public
greenway and a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.'" Dolan challenged the
condition as a taking of private property for a public purpose requir-
ing just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.' °
95. Id. at 2901.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2901-02.
99. Id. at 2917 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
101. Id. at 2317.
102. Id at 2322.
103. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 442 (Or. 1993).
104. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
105. Id. at 2315.
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The Supreme Court stated that had the city required Dolan to dedi-
cate a strip of land to public use, a taking would have occurred. The
issue was whether conditioning the grant of the permit on such a dedi-
cation was a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 10 6 The Court re-
quired the use of the "essential nexus" test to determine whether an
adequate connection existed between the "legitimate state interest"
and the permit condition. °7 Citing Nollan,a°8 the Court reiterated
that under the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the govern-
ment may not require that a person give up one constitutional right in
exchange for a discretionary benefit.' 09
The Court concluded that "the dedication [must] have some reason-
able relationship to the needs created by the [development] '"10 and
that the test to be applied by lower courts when addressing this type of
regulatory taking issue should be that of "rough proportionality.""'
This test requires the authority imposing a condition to "make some
sort of determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.""12
The Court reversed the decision of .the Supreme Court of Oregon
and remanded for factual proceedings consistent with the tests and
analysis."3 .q
C. Recent State and Federal Circuit Court Cases
1. Shubert Organization Inc. v. Landmarks PreservationCommission
In Shubert Organization Inc. v. Landmarks Preservation Commis-
sion,"4 several theater owners in New York City's Broadway area
brought suit to annul the desi nation of twenty-two different Broad-
way theaters as landmarks.'" The suit specifically challenged the
designation process employed by the New York City Landmarks Pres-
ervation Commission. The petitioners claimed that this designation
was an improper exercise of spot zoning, rather than a result of proper
findings for designation under the New York City Landmarks Law.116
The theaters posed two notable arguments. First, the theaters ar-
gued that the process used to determine whether the theaters were
genuine landmarks, and thus ripe for designation under the ordinance
106. Id at 2317.
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
109. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
110. Id at 2319.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2319-20.
113. Id. at 2322.
114. 570 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
115. Id. at 505.
116. Id.
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was arbitrary and not in accord with the mandates in the ordinance.117
Second, the theaters claimed that the designation was an abuse of the
ordinance, because the purpose was not to preserve valuable historic
landmarks, but rather to protect the Broadway theater business, which
was in decline.11 8
Despite these arguments, the Court of Appeals deferred to the "ex-
pertise of the members of the Landmarks Preservation Commission,"
even though evidence that the description and analysis in each of the
Commission's reports about the theaters contained boilerplate intro-
ductions. Evidence further suggested uniformity and routineness in
the designation procedure, rather than a review of each individual the-
ater to establish the "special" 19 historic qualities of a nominated
landmark. 20
The Court of Appeals stated that manipulation of the Landmarks
Law by the Landmarks Preservation Commission for the purpose of
preserving the Broadway theater business, rather than preserving indi-
vidual theaters worthy of landmark designation, would have consti-
tuted improper spot zoning.12  However, the court found that the
Landmarks Preservation Commission evaluated each theater's inte-
rior and exterior utilizing the criteria of the Landmarks Law. The
court indicated that the administrative determination was not arbi-
trary or capricious because it was based upon substantial evidence to
pass judicial inquiry.122
Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals held that under the
holding in Penn Central, the Landmarks Law is constitutional, and the
application of the Landmarks Law did not constitute a compensable
taking.123 Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court ruling dismissing the petition.'24
2. United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia
In United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,2 an
unusual case with a fact pattern similar to Shubert, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reviewed on reargument, its own decision, 26 which
held that the Philadelphia Historic Preservation Ordinance was "un-
fair, unjust and amount[s] to an unconstitutional taking without just
117. Id at 506. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
118. Shubert, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
119. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
120. Shubert, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 506-07.
121. Id at 507.
122. Id
123. Id at 508.
124. Id.
125. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
126. See United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6
(Pa. 1991).
PENN CENTRAL
compensation.' 1 27 Reargument was granted on the sole issue of
whether the designation of a building as historic was a taking under
the Pennsylvania Constitution. 28
The court first noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution may pro-
vide greater rights than those provided under the U.S. Constitution. 29
After a review of the relevant Pennsylvania case law, the court cited
the three conditions for determining that governmental action does
not constitute a taking requiring compensation:
1) the interest of the general public, rather than a particular class of
persons, must require governmental action;
2) the means must be necessary to effectuate that purpose;
3) the means must be not unduly oppressive upon the property
holder, considering the economic impact of the regulation, and the
extent to which the government physically intrudes upon the
property. 130
The court applied each of these elements to the facts presented, and
determined that (1) citizens empowered the legislature to act in areas
of purely historic concern, reflecting a public interest in preserving
historic landmarks; (2) the Supreme Court ruled in Penn Central that
if there is no other practical means to preserve historic landmarks, the
government may historically designate the sites rather than use its em-
inent domain powers to purchase the properties; and (3) although the
regulation may deprive an owner of the property's most valuable use,
it is not likely to deprive it of any profitable uses.13 '
The court held that historic designation did not constitute a com-
pensable taking under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 132 The court
noted that in the fifteen years since the Supreme Court decided Penn
Central, no state court had found a taking in a historic preservation
case.133 Interestingly, the court stated that it would have broken with
the Penn Central decision had it found that the historic preservation
statute at issue constituted a taking under the Pennsylvania
Constitution.13 1
3. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States
The most creative test to be adopted by a court since Penn Central,
and one that clearly points to a change in judicial attitudes toward
127. Id at 13-14.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 615.
130. Id. at 618.
131. Id
132. Id at 620.
133. Id. at 619.
134. Id. The court pointed out that in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887(Pa. 1991), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had rejected the U.S. Supreme
Court's recognition of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Id.
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regulatory takings cases, was applied by the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States.'35 In Loveladies,
the owner of a parcel of land in New Jersey that was primarily desig-
nated as wetlands sought the requisite federal permit for the develop-
ment of the parcel. 136 When the Army Corps of Engineers denied the
permit, despite the fact that all relevant state approvals had been ac-
quired, Loveladies brought an action in the Court of Federal Claims
for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 137
Before addressing the issues at hand, the Court of Appeals noted
that what was not at issue in the case was whether the government had
the right to prevent a property owner from filling or otherwise damag-
ing vital wetlands. 38 Rather, the question before the court was
whether, once the government fulfills its obligation to preserve and
protect the public interest, the cost of the benefit should burden the
affected property owner only, or should be shared by the community
at large.139
The court stated that this analysis would require a balancing be-
tween the legitimate claims of society to constrain individual action
that threatens the larger community, and the rights of the individual
and the U.S. Constitution's commitment to private property as a "bul-
wark for the protection of those rights.' 140 The test required the court
to decide "which collective rights are to be obtained at collective cost,
in order to better preserve collectively the rights of the individual.' 14 '
In a lengthy analysis, the Court of Appeals interpreted the Supreme
Court's test in Penn Central, indicating that "[t]hree criteria would de-
termine the outcome: (1) the character of the governmental action, (2)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and (3) the
extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations."' 42
With regard to the third criterion, "distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations," the Court of Appeals made an interesting observation:
this is a way of limiting takings recovery to landowners who can
demonstrate that they purchased the subject property in reliance on a
state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatiol.143 This,
the court explained, would mean that an owner who bought property
with knowledge of the restriction or restraint would not then have a
protected reliance interest, as the owner could be said to have as-
135. 28 F.3d 1171 (1994).
136. Id. at 1174.
137. Id.




142. Id at 1176 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978)).
143. Id. at 1177.
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sumed the risk that the restraint might prevent unlimited use of the
property in the future."'
In the analysis of the various tests and policy considerations inher-
ent in regulatory takings jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals noted
that the Supreme Court had further defined a non-compensable regu-
latory taking in Lucas'45 to include those regulations that prevented a
use that was not "within the bundle of rights that property lawyers
understand to constitute property."'14 6 In other words, "if the imposed
restraint would have been justified under the state's traditional nui-
sance law, then the property owner's bundle of rights did not include
the right claimed, and no taking could occur. "147
This, the Court of Appeals claimed, dramatically changed the Penn
Central test by eliminating much of the previously necessary ad hoc
analysis (balancing private property rights against state regulatory
policy) and allowing that state's common-law nuisance doctrine to
control. 148 Thus, the change removed from regulatory takings analysis
the "vagaries of the balancing process," substituting instead a refer-
ence familiar to property lawyers everywhere, thereby finally permit-
ting some substantial likelihood of predictability for both property
owners and regulators. 49
Further supporting a case for greater individual property rights pro-
tection, the Court of Appeals noted that in Penn Central, the test was
whether a property owner had, in a sense, already been compensated
by the regulation because it "adjust[ed] the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good,"' 0 whereas the Supreme
Court in Lucas changed that test to whether the regulation adjusted
"the benefits and burdens of economic life . . . in a manner that
secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone con-
cerned."'' Thus, the question of whether an individual property
owner should bear the full burden of a regulation aimed at benefitting
the community at large depends on whether that individual benefits
equally.
The Court of Appeals had little trouble applying these tests to de-
termine that a compensable taking had occurred. Loveladies had
been deprived of all feasible economic use of the property, because
without the permit allowing for the filling in of the wetlands, no use of
any kind could be made of the property other than leaving it in its
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.




150. Id. at 1180 (quoting Penn Cent. ransp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978)).
151. Id (quoting Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992)).
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natural state. 152 Applying the state's nuisance laws,. the court con-
cluded that since Loveladies was entitled to fill the 11.5 acres as a
result of negotiations conducted in accordance with applicable state
law, there could necessarily not be any common-law nuisance issue.153
The court noted that Loveladies purchased the property with the
clear intent to develop it long before the state and federal regulations
at issue came into effect. 154 Since Loveladies had a clear investment-
backed expectation to develop the land, and there did not exist any
statute or state common-law nuisance doctrine that would have put
Loveladies on notice, either actual or constructive, of the likelihood of
the planned development being thwarted through this type of regula-
tory injunction, the Court of Appeals held that a compensable taking
had occurred.
II. HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAWS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
When the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the New York City
Landmarks Law in Penn Central, it did not address the more practical
problems associated with such ordinances: misuse and abuse at the
administrative level. The problems inherent in the application of his-
toric preservation and landmark designation laws at the local level,
and even at the federal and state levels, are compounded by the hid-
den agendas of those who would abuse those laws for ulterior motives
having little to do with historic preservation.
It is all too common today to find development-limiting laws and
regulations, such as New York's State Environmental Quality Review
Act' 5" ("SEQRA") and historic preservation statutes, being used as
swords to stifle development by those who would prefer either to see
their own neighborhoods remain free from changes that they deem
undesirable or to prevent the entry of an economic competitor, rather
than as shields to protect genuinely fragile environments or to pre-
serve genuinely significant historic landmarks.
For example, a property owner who desires to improve vacant land
or renovate an existing structure may be unpleasantly surprised to
find that, despite having received all necessary building approvals and
permits, no construction may commence because the property is sud-
denly being considered for protection under a landmarks preservation
ordinance at the insistance of a "concerned" citizens group. Although
many such nominations may be triggered by genuine concerns, a trend
towards less discriminate selection of what is historically "significant"
or "special" coupled with minimal, inaccurate, or unreliable evidence
152. Id at 1182.
153. Id
154. Id
155. NEW YORK ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984).
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of a property's historic value threatens to undermine the true goals of
such legislation.
It has been noted by one commentator that:
the growing breadth of the definition of what is important to pre-
serve can reduce the concept to meaninglessness and lead to abuses.
Preservation is not well served if it is trivialized by those claiming
that much of what exists has historic virtue or if it is abused by those
with a hidden agenda, such as to stop new development or to exact
extractions from developers. 56
The New York Court of Appeals has indicated that "challenges un-
related to environmental concerns can generate interminable delay
and interference" with a development project. 5 7 The court has recog-
nized "the danger of allowing special interest groups or pressure
groups, motivated by economic self-interests, to misuse SEQRA for
such purposes. 158
These abuses have also been recognized by a former chairperson of
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, who wrote:
[i]t is becoming increasingly apparent that there is a growing
tendency to use designation for purposes outside the jurisdiction of
the [Landmark Preservation] law and even at times explicitly denied
to the Landmarks Preservation Commission by the law ...
[L]andmarking is being used to stop demolition, to prevent develop-
ment and change, to prevent a high-rise with change in use, bulk,
scale, etc.... The misuse of the law places in jeopardy the past and
future legitimate designations, and, most importantly, places injeopardy the future of the Landmarks Preservation Commission
and the Landmarks Law.159
Much of the problem is in the language of the laws themselves. For
instance, the designation criteria in New York City's Landmarks Pres-
ervation Law160 has often been criticized as vague and subjective. In
his dissent in Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist offered one such criti-
cism, when he noted that "the ordinance ... gives little guidance to
the Commission in its selection of landmark sites.' 61 Without suffi-
cient specific guidance, it is left to the subjective opinion of the
Landmarks Preservation Commission to decide what is "special" and
therefore eligible for designation under the ordinance.
Another problem can be found in the nomination process. In the
absence of detailed statutory guidelines, too often the proponents of a
156. See DAVID LISTOKIN, LIVING CrEs 29 (1985).
157. Society of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1041 (N.Y.
1991); see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 559 N.E.2d 641 (N.Y.
1990).
158. Society of Plastics, 573 N.E.2d at 1041 (citations omitted).
159. Beverly Moss Spatt, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1980, at A16.
160, See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
161. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.1 (1978) (Ren-
quist, J., dissenting).
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designation will fail to produce the definitive information necessary
truly to appreciate whether, in the case of the New York City
Landmarks Law, a property has "special character and special histori-
cal or aesthetic interest or value." 162 Instead, they rely upon unsub-
stantiated allegations, rumors, and folk lore to attempt to justify
landmark designation.
In the New York City ordinance, the phrases "special character"
and "special historical or aesthetic interest or value"' 63 are undeniably
vague and require some subjectivity in the decision-making process,
but they also make it clear that ordinary properties are not proper
subjects for designation simply because they are old. Many building
and landscape designs hold some aesthetic interest or value to some-
one, but it is not prudent public policy to designate undistinguished
buildings and landscapes.
One commentator summarized the abuse of landmark preservation
laws and the danger to be averted by stating:
[A]ll too frequently it is used when the real, almost hidden agenda is
something quite different-the equally legitimate issues of open
space, wildlife conservation, architectural preservation, protection
of property values or just plain "no more development wanted." By
lumping them all under the label "historic-landmark preservation,"
we lessen our ability to weigh the values of each, and make it more
difficult to preserve a truly historic landmark when one is indanger.' 64
There may be no sure way to prevent all abuses of landmark preser-
vation laws. However, by clearly defining designation criteria at the
legislative level, demanding definitive proof based upon scholarly re-
search at the nomination level, and adhering to strict procedures at
the administrative level, the possibility of a disingenuous nomination
succeeding in thwarting a landowner's intended, legitimate use of his
or her property will be significantly reduced.
III. PENN CENTRAL REVISITED?
In the seventeen years since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Penn
Central, significant changes have occurred in both the Court's ap-
proach to regulatory takings cases and in the composition of the Court
itself. Of the nine Supreme Court Justices sitting on the bench when
Penn Central was decided, only Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the
dissent, remains. With the addition of several conservative Justices,
the potential for a decision from the Supreme Court providing greater
162. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
164. Karolyn Wrightson, Designing Landmarks: Beware Hidden Agendas, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1988, at 40. Wrightson was Executive Director of the Westchester
County Historical Society at that time.
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protection of property rights in historic preservation and other regula-
tory takings cases is enhanced.
What if Penn Central, or a case with similar facts, were to be
presented to the Supreme Court today? As the analysis of Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central reveals,' 65 much of the criticism of
the majority's reasoning was concentrated on what Justice Rehnquist
viewed as a lack of reciprocal advantage, which should trigger the
need for compensation. 66 The dissent also criticized any analogy be-
tween prior cases decided on nuisance principals and the facts
presented in Penn Central.167 Finally, the dissent addressed the issue
of Penn Central's ability to make a reasonable return on its
investment.' 68
Each of these criteria were addressed by the Supreme Court in sub-
sequent regulatory takings cases, and the results disclose a trend to-
ward stricter scrutiny and greater protection of private property
rights. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 69 Justice
Rehnquist was joined in dissent by newly appointed Justices Scalia
and O'Connor in again criticizing the Court's policy of applying the
nuisance exception to compensable regulatory takings too broadly.'
70
It was Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,'7' another case de-
cided in 1987, that first hinted that Justice Scalia (who wrote the opin-
ion) and Justice O'Connor would join with Chief Justice Rehnquist in
requiring a clear nexus between a restrictive regulation and the justifi-
cation for the prohibition.'72 Although the government imposition in
Nollan was the requirement of the grant of an easement in favor of
the public rather than a restriction on the owner's use of the prop-
erty, 73 the holding led the way to future decisions protective of the
private property rights.
The case that best indicates the direction of the current Supreme
Court with regard to regulatory takings. is Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council. 74 The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia,
makes it clear that the Court will no longer permit a compensable
taking for a public purpose to hide behind the "nuisance" exception
unless a serious potential harm to the public is abated by the restric-
tion at issue.
The Court emphasized the danger presented by a regulation that
deprives an owner of the economic use of his or her land by requiring
165. See supra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
169. 480 U.S. 470 (1987); see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
170. Id. at 512-13.
171. 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see supra notes 73-78.
172. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
173. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
174. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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it to be left in its present state. 175 The Court stated that a governmen-
tal authority may only resist compensation in the name of "nuisance"
if the proscribed use was not permitted prior to the regulation's enact-
ment.176 Thus, unless a regulation proscribes a use that would have
constituted a common-law nuisance under state law, if the regulation
forbids all economically viable uses of the land, a taking has occurred.
This type of "constructive notice" permits a landowner or prospec-
tive purchaser to predict what type of regulatory restrictions may be
imposed without compensation through reference to state common
law. This is precisely the interpretation of the Lucas holding that was
applied by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States,177 in which it was held that a compensable taking
had occurred when an existing property right, not considered a nui-
sance under state common law, was denied by a newly enacted
regulation. 78
The Supreme Court, if presented with the facts of Penn Central to-
day, could apply the takings criteria set forth in Lucas to hold that the
designation of the Grand Central Terminal as a historic landmark con-
stituted a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. By deny-
ing Penn Central a property use that: (1) was permitted when the
property was purchased, (2) did not constitute a nuisance under New
York common law, and (3) constituted a reasonable investment-
backed expectation of Penn Central, the City restricted the use of the
terminal through landmark designation in a manner similar to restric-
tions development of the beach property in Lucas or the wetlands
property in Loveladies.
CONCLUSION
Thus, it is conceivable that, when the Supreme Court is next asked
to address a case in which historic preservation already results in
claiming a regulatory taking, the Court may find that a compensable
taking has occurred without overruling Penn Central.
175. Id at 2894.
176. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
177. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (1994); see supra notes
133-45 and accompanying text.
178. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1182; see supra notes 150-52 and accompanying
text.
